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1. Arguments from authority 
 
In standard textbook discussions of inductive argument forms (e.g., Bassham et al., 2013) 
arguments from authority are defined in the following way. They are arguments in which an 
arguer has offered as support for her conclusion at least one premise that makes reference to the 
testimony of someone who is an authority with respect to the probable truth of a fact that, if true, 
would serve to support the arguer’s conclusion. Depending on the kind of fact that is needed and 
the kind of conclusion an arguer is trying to establish, the authority possessed by the individual 
cited in such an argument can come from one of two sources. It can come from the fact that the 
individual being cited is an eyewitness to a series of events that, if they occurred as described, 
would make the arguer’s conclusion more probable. Or it can derive from the fact that the 
individual being cited is an expert in an area of study or practice from which the premise that is 
needed to make the arguer’s conclusion more probable can be established. An example of the 
former might include an argument in which the arguer cites the first-person accounts of those 
maltreated in a prison system in order to reach the conclusion that probably abuse that has been 
described in that way has occurred. Examples of the latter might include an argument in which 
the arguer cites the statements of a paleontologist in order to support the claim that birds are 
essentially a kind of dinosaur or an argument in which the arguer cites the statements of an 
astrophysicist in order to support the claim that there really are such things as gravity waves. 
In standard textbook treatments of this kind, the sections that deal with arguments from 
authority are also invariably hedged about with a variety of cautions and provisos regarding their 
use. In the case of eyewitness authority there are warnings regarding the competence of 
eyewitnesses. Is there reason to believe that the individual whose testimony was cited was likely 
not in the place that she needed to be in order to be an eyewitness? If not, then do we have any 
reason to believe that this person lacked the perceptual or intellectual capacity to witness that 
which she claims to have? In the case of arguments that rely upon expert authority, similar 
warnings are issued, though they are more nuanced and complex. Yes, it may well be the case 
that so-and-so is an authority in a particular area of expertise. But that won’t mean much if she is 
speaking on a matter unrelated to that area of expertise. Nor will it mean much if the matter is 
not something on which someone can be an expert (e.g., Bassham et al., 2013, pp. 140-144).  
Significantly, in her textbook, Govier (2014) goes one step further. She advises arguers to 
avoid citing the authority of an expert in an argument if the matter on which that expert has been 
cited is something that is contentious within that expert’s field of expertise: on which, in other 
words, there does not at present exist a professional consensus. As she puts it: 
 
Even within fields where qualified experts share background beliefs, they may 
differ on particular issues. Consider, for instance, the area of child development. 
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Some experts believe that children do not acquire abstract logical concepts until 
their early teens, whereas others think that they acquire such concepts as early as 
six or eight years of age. In the face of this sort of disagreement, you cannot 
justify accepting one claim or the other simply by appealing to some expert, 
because the experts disagree with each other. Anyone who disputed your claim 
could just find another expert and argue against you by citing that person. 
Defending a claim on the basis of authority is appropriate only if experts in the 
area generally agree about it. (Govier, 2014, p. 125) 
 
On a Govier-style understanding of expert authority, therefore, it would seem that an argument 
that relies upon such authority will only be a genuine argument from authority, as opposed to a 
fallacious (or inappropriate) appeal to authority, if it has two features not explicitly mentioned in 
these other accounts. Such an argument must, first of all, involve the introduction through one or 
more of its premises of what is taken to be a consensus within the area of expertise that is being 
appealed to by the arguer; and, secondly, due to this prior constraint, it must also involve the 
introduction of what is at most a sample authority: that is, one whose testimony as to the 
existence and nature of this consensus would most properly be described in terms of their having 
simply relayed the facts relative to this matter—via the arguer—to the argument’s recipients. 
 
2. Arguments from expert opinion 
 
Construed in this way, arguments from expert authority seem very different, therefore, from what 
our speaker is talking about today. What Dr. Mizrahi has in his sights are arguments from expert 
opinion. These seem to involve something like the following. There is an area of expertise in 
which some individual is reckoned to be an authority. There is also an arguer who wishes to use 
the expertise of this individual to support a claim that the arguer wishes to make. And so the 
arguer finds an instance of that individual’s testimony that will serve this purpose. But rather 
than find an instance that merely relays, in a somewhat anodyne manner, the professional 
consensus in the area of expertise in which the individual cited is an authority, the arguer finds 
instead an instance in which the authority cited relies upon her knowledge base and professional 
training to make a further, independent judgement about some expertise-related but non-
consensus matter—in which, in other words, the authority, relying upon her professional 
expertise, attempts to add to the world some new piece of knowledge based upon an individual, 
professionally-informed judgement call.  
Examples of this sort of argument are easy to imagine. Presumably they would include an 
argument in which the arguer cites the predictions made by a specialist in international 
diplomacy to support a claim regarding the future of Sino-Japanese relations or an argument in 
which an arguer cites the predictions made by a specialist in climate science to support a claim 
regarding the year in which New York City will finally sink beneath the waves. And it is easy to 
see why one might confuse arguments of the one kind with arguments of the other. They both 
involve relying upon an individual who is using her expertise in an area relevant to that 
expertise. And they both involve providing an authoritative statement on a question that could, at 
least potentially, be settled within the area of expertise in question. 
As we have seen, however, Mizrahi is not happy with arguments of the latter kind; and it 
is not hard to see why. Even before considering the evidence that he has provided us with, there 
seems to be something inherently dicey in the idea of trusting an authority on a matter that is 
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both important enough to require the voice of an expert but debatable enough that there has yet 
to develop in that authority’s area of expertise any sort of professional consensus. Indeed, it was 
concern over precisely this sort of situation that prompted Govier to restrict legitimate arguments 
from authority to those in which a general professional consensus is being relayed. Confronted 
with a situation in which no such consensus exists, Govier would probably agree with Mizrahi 
and counsel that the preferred path is for the arguer to simply reproduce the argument of the 
expert who has proffered her opinion. The alternative is to provoke in the argument’s addressees 
and respondents a game of dueling experts, which would only serve to undermine the value of 
the premise or premises expressing the judgement of the original expert authority.  
But then, of course, there is also the evidence; which, as Mizrahi points out, seems to 
suggest that experts in a variety of fields are no better than anyone else in managing to escape the 
various cognitive sins that flesh is heir to. Experts have been shown to be overconfident; they 
have been shown to suffer from confirmation bias; and they have been shown to engage in a 
decision-making process called “anchoring”, in which one re-jiggers the character of one’s 
starting point in order to produce the outcome that one antecedently desires. When it comes to 
individuals applying the expertise that they have acquired, they are not what Mizrahi would call 
reliable. As he puts it: “not only do experts fall prey to pretty much the same kinds of cognitive 
biases that novices fall prey to, they also tend to use the sort of unreliable decision heuristics that 
novices typically use.” 
 
3. Questions regarding further research 
 
As Mizrahi notes, many of those who have engaged with his views on this topic in the past have 
been moved to dismiss them on the basis of their being premised upon a set of ultimately self-
defeating claims. It may or may not comfort him to know that I am not among those who see his 
views in this way. The example of Govier, I think, demonstrates that the question he is asking is 
a valid one, so long as we distinguish between what is known collectively in a field of expertise 
and what is being independently proposed through an expert’s individual judgement call. But I 
think that his general research program makes sense as well. Indeed, when it comes to the 
question of speaker reliability, I have spent much of my own professional life focusing on similar 
sorts of issues. I have, for example, directly engaged with the empirical evidence that has been 
offered in favor of such claims as “you can’t believe what you read on the internet” and “gay 
kids always lie about their experiences” (Fields, 2007; 2009). The idea that a class of speakers 
might be largely unreliable when it comes to certain topics—and demonstrably so—does not 
seem to me to be an impossibility nor to involve necessarily the rejection of the idea that 
testimony in general ought to be treated as credible until proven otherwise. 
 As such, what I would like to offer at this point are some questions regarding further 
research. For I am afraid that the most destructive criticism that might be offered by someone 
who was in sympathy with Mizrahi’s approach would be something like the following: that the 
data that he has provided to support his claim is not sufficiently broad in its scope and, therefore, 
that his overall claim may not be sufficiently well-supported. Specifically, I wonder: are there 
types of expertise where judgement calls are relatively more well-founded than in others? The 
majority of his examples focus on situations where a standard of practice is being applied within 
the context of a work life, where many, many decisions are being quickly made and on a daily 
basis (e.g., policing, law, medicine, software engineering, and securities analysis). The one 
exception is philosophy, a notably (perhaps even scandalously) open-ended area of academic 
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expertise. Would similar results obtain in an area of expertise that was less open-ended (say, 
physics, chemistry, or climatology) or on a matter that was considerably more disconnected from 
one’s day-to-day work life and upon which one might have more leisure time to reflect? While of 
course the issue of conflict among experts on non-consensus matters can come up anywhere, it 
might well be the case that not all expert opinions are equally unreliable due to the problem of 
cognitive bias. There could, of course, be just as much cognitive bias in the words of an 
exobiologist hazarding a guess on the likelihood of life on Europa as in the opinions of a judge 
analyzing legal vignettes. But there could also be less. The problem is that we can’t tell from the 
level and type of evidence at hand which is which; and thus, strictly speaking, the evidence 
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